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THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
It is now twenty-five years since the organization of the body
known as the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Their main work has been, and still is, to express in
legislative form, clarify, simplify and make uniform our com-
mercial law, using that term in its broadest sense. They have
drafted and recommended to the legislatures of the States, the
Negotiable Instruments Act, the Warehouse Receipts Acts, the
Bills of Lading Act, the Transfer of Stock Act, the Sales Act,
and the Partnership Act. The Negotiable Instruments Act was
adopted by the Conference in 1896. It has now been passed by
forty-seven state legislatures. The Bills of Lading Act was
adopted by the Conference in i9o9. The last commercial act
adopted prior to the adoption of the Partnership Act last October,
was passed by eleven state legislatures prior to the present
winter. The number of states adopting the other commercial
acts vary usually, though not always, with the time which has
elapsed since they were first recommended by the Conference.
With intelligent co6peration from members of the Bar and com-
mercial bodies interested, it would seem to be merely a question
of time when all the states will have adopted this legislation.
This work on commercial law has not been the only work
undertaken by the Conference. They have also drafted and
recommended an Act Relating to Wills Executed Without the
State, a Family Desertion Act, a Marriage Evasion and Violation
Act, a Divorce Act, a Marriage and License Act, a Cold Storage
of Food Act, an Acknowledgment of Instruments Act, and a
Workmen's Compensation Act, besides considering and recom-
mending the Child Labor Act prepared by the National Child
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Labor Association, and the Pure Food Act modeled after the
United States Pure Food and Drugs Act. But various local and
economic conditions, and the conflict of opposing social forces
have so far made it impossible to secure the general adoption of
these non-commercial acts. While such an act as the Act Relat-
ing to Wills Executed Without the State has been adopted in nine
states, the Divorce Act which passed the Conference in 19o6 has
only been adopted by three state legislatures.
It may fairly be said, therefore, that the work of the Commis-
sioners, outside the field of commercial law, while of great value,
is primarily suggestive and educational. For instance, no rea-
sonably informed person desirous of improving the child labor
laws of his state would draft an act on that subject without exam-
ining the Uniform Child Labor Act recommended by the Com-
missioners; and such a person would undoubtedly incorporate
many of the features of the Uniform Act into his own bill, but
he would probably also find that local conditions rendered it
advisable to make more or less drastic many of the provisions.
Even were it practically possible to secure the general adoption
of the Uniform Child Labor Act or the Uniform Workmen's
Compensation Act the acts would probably be changed in many
respects within a few years. Legislative problems growing out
of child employment in industry and industrial accidents are
primarily administrative. In both fields of regulation there is
yet much to be learned from practical experience. An act dealing
with either subject which is practically possible today may be quite
different from an act on the same subject practically possible two
or three decades hence.
On the other hand, in expressing in legislative form our com-
mercial and business association law, the Commissioners, if their
work is well done, are creating that which will probably long
outlast the present generation. The Uniform Negotiable Instru-
ments Act, for instance, which was the first act sanctioned by the
Conference, would have been equally applicable to commercial
conditions in the early eighteenth century, and, with compara-
tively slight modifications, could have been adapted to conditions
in classic Rome. Again, in spite of recent great industrial
changes, the Uniform Partnership Act would have met conditions
in Lord Mansfield's day as well as those of today. As these two
acts would have worked as well in 1765 as in 1915, there may be
a reasonable expectation that they will meet conditions of one
hundred and fifty years hence, and what is true of these two acts
is true of the other commercial acts drafted by the Conference.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
This work of expressing in legislative form our commercial
law will be comparatively permanent only if it is well done. To
have it well done takes time and intelligent effort. Intelligent
effort, when translated by the practical experience of the Com-
missioners, means patient, intelligent, group criticism of expert
suggestion. When the Commissioners-or, as the body is tech-
nically called, "The Conference of Commissioners"-decide to
draft a law on a commercial subject they authorize their standing
Committee on Commercial Law to submit a draft; they also now
invariably, authorize their Committee to employ a draftsman.
The initial work is done by the person so employed.
My personal experience leads me to believe that the draftsman
should not work alone. The draft which he submits to the
Committee should have had its every sentence wrangled over by
one or more good men. For this, those of us who are connected
with Law Schools have an advantage. We can use our graduate
students or the holders of graduate research fellowships as per-
sons on whom to try out our ideas. The holder of a graduate
fellowship in law is almost invariably a man of real ability. If
his nature is a fighting one, so that he will come back in argu-
ment, he will render the draftsman invaluable service. In this
way I am under a very real obligation to Mr. James B. Lichten-
berger, now in the active practice of the law in Philadelphia,
who, as one of the Gowen Memorial Research Fellows in the
Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, devoted more
than a year to the study of partnership in connection with the
first two drafts for which I was responsible.
The draftsman has a heavy responsibility, but his responsibility
is to the Committee on Commercial Law. The Committee, not
the draftsman, is responsible to the Conference. I am in a
position to testify that this responsibility is taken seriously. The
first group criticism to which the draft is submitted is that of the
Committee. The members of the Committee spend much time
over a draft before submitting it to the Conference. They also
send copies of the proposed draft for criticism to selected lists
of persons who are believed to have some special knowledge of
the subject of the proposed act inviting suggestion and criticism,
besides frequently calling into conference with them those who
from their peculiar opportunity may be supposed to have an
expert knowledge of the subject. Thus in connection with their
work on the Partnership Act, before the Committee determined
to adopt the legal theory of the nature of a partnership on which
the Act is drawn, they called into a conference, which lasted two
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full days, all the teachers of partnership in the larger universi-
ties of the United States and a number of lawyers of eminence
known to have had large practical experience in partnership
business.
The personnel of the Committee on Commercial Law is also
worthy of note. During the years when the Partnership Act
was in course of preparation its membership included Mr.
Mordecai of South Carolina, a leading lawyer of that state
with a very large partnership business, and Professor Samuel
Williston of Harvard, the draftsman of all the other commercial
acts except the Negotiable Instruments Act; while the most
prominent writer on partnership, Professor Francis M. Burdick
of Columbia, though not at that time a member of the Com-
mittee, attended every session at which the Partnership Act was
discussed, giving invaluable assistance.
But no matter how carefully the first draft may be prepared,
experience has shown both the Conference and its Committee that
the first draft should not be submitted to the Conference for
adoption, but merely for criticism and instruction as to the nature
of the changes which it is desirable to insert in the second draft.
The object is not primarily to get the work done, but to get it
well done. An act on a commercial subject needs much more
group criticism than it is possible for the Conference to give at
any one annual session. Time also must be given for the wide
distribution of the draft and a consideration of the suggestions
and criticisms received. With the exception of the Negotiable
Instruments Act, none of the commercial acts have been adopted
by the Conference in less than three years from the time the
first draft has been submitted, while on many of the acts the
Conference has spent considerably longer time.
To this record of careful work the Partnership Act is no
exception. It is more than twelve years since the Conference
instructed its Committee on Commercial Law to draft and submit
such an act to "The next Annual Conference." Since then, and
prior to the final adoption of the Act on October x4 th last, no
less than eight tentative drafts were before the Commissioners,
and discussion of the final drafts has occupied a large part of
their annual sessions for the past three years.
The first expert employed by the Committee was the late Dean
Ames of the Harvard Law School. Mr. Ames submitted to the
Committee two drafts. On his death I was asked to take up
the work.
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The merit of the proposed Act depends upon: First: Whether
it states the law in simple, clear language; Second: The extent
to which it renders certain existing uncertainties; Third:
Whether the changes which it introduces into the law are bene-
ficial.
Those who read the text can judge for themselves whether the
Act fulfils the first test. As originally drafted, where it was
desired to express in a section the same idea as that expressed
in the corresponding section of the English Partnership Act,
and the wording of the English Act was clear, its wording was
followed without regard to terseness or simplicity of expression.
In the preparation of the final draft, however, the Committee,
following the express directions of the Conference, reduced the
language in these sections to as simple a form as possible. In
this work of verbal simplification most valuable assistance was
received by the Committee and its draftsman from Mr. Charles
E. Shepard, one of the Commissioners from the State of Wash-
ington. Thus paragraph 4 of Section 7, giving rules for deter-
mining whether a person who shares in the profits is or is not a
partner, a paragraph occupying more than a page in the English
Act, is in the Uniform Act reduced to twelve lines.
The second test is the extent to which existing uncertainties
in the law of partnership are rendered certain. Before answer-
ing this question it is perhaps well to emphasize the fact that
there is one matter connected with partnership which legislation
cannot make certain. By no human ingenuity would a Partner-
ship Act which does not abolish common law partnerships enable
the person who reads it to tell in every supposable case whether
there is or is not a partnership.
In the proposed act, Section 6 defining a partnership reads:
"(i) A partnership is an association of two or more
persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit.
"(:2) But any association formed under any other
statute of this state, or any statute adopted by authority,
other than the authority of this state, is not a partnership
under this act, unless such association would have been a
partnership in this state prior to the adoption of this act;
but this act shall apply to limited partnerships except in
so far as the statutes relating to such partnerships are
inconsistent herewith."
The next Section follows the English act in giving rules to
assist in determining whether a partnership does or does not
exist. Thus paragraph 4 of the Section provides that the receipt
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by a person of a share of the profits of the business is prima facie
evidence that he is a partner in the business, but no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received in a payment of a
debt, as wages, as rent, as an annuity to a widow or represen-
tative of a deceased partner, or as interest on a loan though the
amount of profits vary with the profits of the business. This
and the other rules given express the net result of the decisions
on what constitutes a partnership, from the famous early case of
Waugh v. Carver before Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the present
day.
In spite of these rules, however, it will always be possible to
give a number of real or supposititious cases in which men will
differ as to whether the facts show co-ownership of a given
business. The uncertainty lies in the fundamental character-
istic which distinguishes partnerships from every other business
association. All other business associations are statutory in
origin. They are formed by the happening of an event desig-
nated in a statute as necessary to their formation. In corpora-
tions this act -may be the issuing of a charter by the proper
officer of the state; in limited partnerships, the filing by the asso-
ciates of a specified document in a public office. On the other
hand, an infinite number of combinations of circumstances may
result in co-ownership of a business. Partnership is the
residuum, including all forms of co-ownership, of a business
except those business associations organized under a specific
statute.
If a partnership act were to declare that a partnership was not
formed until the formal requirements of the statute were complied
with, it would not be a statute regulating common law partner-
ships, but one abolishing common law partnership and estab-
lishing a new form of statutory association. If no formal act
can be specifically designated as a necessary prerequisite to the
formation of a common law partnership, it follows that it is not
always easy to determine whether the acts proved indicate
co-ownership of a business. Ownership, whether the ownership
of a business or the separate ownership of personal or real prop-
erty, involves the idea of control; but the degree of control
necessary is incapable of exact definition. Neither is it possible
to catalogue all the possible combinations of fact, which, when
found to exist, will conclusively prove ownership.
'2. H. B1. 235 (Eng. 1793).
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
For example: take the leading case of Cox v. Hickman.
There a firm engaged in the iron business failed. The creditors
made an arrangement with the members of the firm and certain
so-called trustees, by which the legal title to the property was
vested in the trustees, who conducted the business under the pos-
sible if not the actual direction of the creditors. Out of the
receipts, after paying the operating expenses, they were to pay
the creditors. When the creditors had been paid in full, the prop-
erty was to be returned to the original owners. The question at
issue was whether the creditors of the original firm had created
a new partnership of which they were members. The English
judges decided that no such partnership was created. The propo-
sition for which the case stands, however, must be confined almost
to its exact facts. Change these facts slightly and there will be
a doubtful case, and one which will remain doubtful after the
adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act or any other conceiv-
able act.
If, however, it is not possible for any statutory statement of the
law to do away with those uncertainties which may arise under
supposable combinations of fact as to whether a particular asso-
ciation is a co-ownership of a business, many other uncertainties
in our partnership law and its administration can and will be done
away with by the adoption of the Uniform Act.
The uncertainties of our common law in this country are due,
in great part at least, to three distinct causes: Conflicts between
the decisions of the different states, absence of legal authority,
and confusion in legal theory. In our partnership law the first,
while a distinct source of uncertainty, is not nearly as potent as
the extraordinary lack of authority in any given state, and often
in all states, on matters of considerable practical importance.
The chief source of uncertainty, however, as well as the source
of several distinctly inequitable rules of our existing law of
partnership is the confusion in regard to the nature of a partner-
ship and the legal incidents attached to the partner's right in
partnership property.
Before taking up the way in which the Uniform Act deals with
this major source of defects in our existing law of partnership, a
brief reference will be made to some things of minor importance
which will be accomplished by the adoption of the Act.
In view of the confusions which have arisen in our law in
I8. H. L. C. 268 (Eng. i86o).
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regard to notice, it is interesting to know that Section 3 of Ihe
Act carefully defines knowledge and notice. As there defined, a
person has knowledge of a fact, not only when he actually knows
of it, but also when 'he has knowledge of such other facts as
should have prompted an investigation; while a person has notice
of a fact when the person who claims the benefit of the notice
states the fact to such person, or delivers through the mail or by
other means of communication a written statement of the fact to
such person, or to a proper person at his place of business or
residence. It will be noticed that these provisions draw a clear
line between knowledge and notice. The fact that the word
"notice" in judicial opinions and in other legal writings is often
used when "knowledge" is intended has led to a great deal of
confusion, of which the extraordinary expression "constructive
notice" is evidence. To avoid this confusion, the word "notice,"
as used in the Act, means that if certain definite things have been
done, the person who has done them has a right to assert that
notice has been had and to act accordingly, irrespective of
whether the person charged has actual knowledge or not.
Lawyers are familiar with existing confusions surrounding the
subject of conveyance of real property to or by a partnership.
Section 8 permits the acquisition of real property by the partner-
ship in the partnership name, the partnership acquiring the entire
estate of the grantor, although the conveyance is without words
of inheritance, unless a contrary intent appears. Secti6n io deals
with the conveyance of real property by a partnership, the sec-
tion as a whole being a complete codification of the subject. In
permitting a partnership to acquire real property by a conveyance
executed in the partnership name, the intent of the Conference
was to avoid those complications now arising when an attempt
is made to make such a conveyance. They also believed that
this method of holding real property, not merely when the part-
nership is formed for trading in land, but in many other cases,
would be a real convenience. Of course, it is not probable that
the practice of holding title to partnership real estate in the part-
nership name will become universal. Under the provisions of
the Act, where title to real property is in the partnership name,
any partner may convey title to such property by a conveyance
executed in the partnership name. This gives to each partner a
very large control over the property, even though the Act does
provide that the partnership may recover the property so conveyed
by a partner unless the act of selling is one for carrying on the
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business of the partnership in the usual way, or unless the property
has been conveyed by the grantee, or a person claiming through
such grantee, to a holder for value without knowledge that the
partner making the conveyance has exceeded his authority. Still
we may expect that a controlling consideration which will move
many to place title to real property in the partnership name will
be the convenience of being able to convey a good title in case of
the death of a partner without having to secure the signature of
persons not members of the partnership.
Section I6 which deals with the holding out of persons as
partners who are not actually partners, or, as it is usually called,
partnership by estoppel, clears several doubts and confusions of
our existing case law. It has been held that a person is liable if
he has been held out as a partner and knows that he is being
held out, unless he prevents such holding out, even if to do so he
has to take affirmative action.3 On the other hand, the weight of
authority is to the effect that to be held as a partner he must
consent to the holding out and that consent is a matter of fact to
be proved as any other fact. That Act as drafted follows the
weight of authority which is based on better reasoning.4"
Another confusion connected with this subject of partnership
by estoppel arises when A is held out with his consent as a partner
of B, B in fact being in business by himself. Can anyone who
relies on the representation have priority on the property in the
business over those creditors of B who trusted only B and not
A and B? The case of Thayer v. Humphreys5 answers this
question in the affirmative. Other cases have reached an opposite
conclusion. 6 The Act in effect takes the position that if there is
no partnership in fact the law should not treat any part of B's
property as a partnership fund. Under the Act, therefore, in
the case put, A and B would be liable jointly, but the creditor
who thought there was a firm of A and B would have no priority
over the other creditors of B on any part of B's assets.
Section 21 does away with the present confusion which in
most states surrounds the obligation of a partner to account for
'Fletcher v. Pullen, 70 Md. 205 (1889) ; Rittenhouse v. Leig, 57 Miss.
697 (i88o) ; Speer v. Bishop, 24 Oh. St. 598 (1874) ; Prof. Burdick in 30
Cyc. 393.
"Morgan v. Farrel, 58 Conn. 413 (i8go); Bishop v. Georgeson, 6o Ill.
484 (1871) ; Ihmsen v. Lathrop, IO4 Pa. 365 (1883) ; Wood's Collyer, 75, n.
p91 Wis. 276 (I895).
'Burdick, Partnership, p. I6 et seq.
625_
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profits derived by him without consent of the other partners from
any transaction connected with the conduct of the partnership, or
the use of its property. At present it is not always clear whether
the obligation to account, when the partner has money or other
property in his hands, is or is not an obligation in the nature of a
trust. For instance, A, B and C are partners. A, as a result
of a transaction connected with the conduct of the partnership,
has a specific sum of money or other property which can be
traced. A is insolvent. In many jurisdictions it is not certain
today whether the claim of the partnership against A is the
claim of an ordinary creditor or whether it is a claim to the
specific property or money in his hands. The words of Section
21 remove this doubt. They declare that the partner shall "hold
as a trustee" for the partnership any profits derived by him from
any transaction connected with the partnership business.
Section 27 deals with the assignment of a partner's interest
in the partnership. In actual practice, such assignments are
usually by way of mortgage in return for a loan not to the firm
but to the partner making the mortgage. The partner making
such a mortgage does not, except in rare instances, intend to
disassociate himself from the business; yet the weight of author-
ity is unquestionably to the effect that all assignments of a
partner's interest, whether outright or by way of mortgage, dis-
solve the firm. 7 The Section referred to, which follows in this
respect the English Act, provides that any conveyance, whether
absolute or by way of mortgage, does not of itself dissolve the
partnership, nor as against the other partners in the absence of
agreement, entitle the assignee during the continuance of a part-
nership to interfere with the management or administration of
the partnership business or affairs, or to require any information
on account of partnership transaction, or in respect to the part-
nership books. Of itself it merely entitles the assignee to receive
in accordance with his contract the profits to which the assigning
partner would be otherwise entitled. If the assigning partner
neglects his personal relation, the other partners may dissolve
the partnership under Section 31 of the Act. But the mere fact
of assignment, without more, will not have this effect.
The subject of the dissolution and winding up of a partnership
is involved in considerable confusion principally b~cause of the
SBates, §§ 158-i68, 931-933; Collyer, 151, 161; George, 153; Kent, 59;
Lindley, 397, et seq., 62o; Beale's Parsons, §§ io6, 305, 3o6; Jas. Parsons,
§ 175; Story, §§ 272, 377, 308.
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various ways in which the word "dissolution" is employed.
The term sometimes designates the completion of the winding
up of partnership affairs. This, the end of the association, should
be called the termination of the partnership. Again the term is
sometimes used to designate the process of liquidation or winding
up. We are frequently informed in the syllabi of cases and in
digests that a partnership is not dissolved by the retirement of a
member if the other members have a right to continue the busi-
ness. What is meant, of course, is that the right of winding
up the affairs of the partnership does not always exist when the
business ceases to be carried on by all the persons who were
carrying it on prior to the retirement of one of them. Lastly,
the term is employed as designating a change in the relation
of the partners caused by any partner ceasing to be associated
in the carrying on of the business. As thus used "dissolution"
does not terminate the partnership, it merely ends the carrying
on of the business in that partnership. The partnership continues
until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed. This
last is the sense in which the term "dissolution" is used in the
Act. Section 29 reads: "The dissolution of a partnership is the
change in the relation of the partners caused by any partner
ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from
the winding up of the business." Section 30 says: "On disso-
lution the partnership is not terminated, but continues until the
winding up of partnership affairs is completed."
Section 31 (2) declares that dissolution of a partnership is
caused "in contravention of the agreement betveen the partners,
where the circumstances do not permit a dissolution under any
other provision of this section, by the express will of any partner
at any time." This paragraph settles a matter on which at present
considerable confusion and uncertainty exists. It allows a part-
ner to dissolve a partnership in contravention of the agreement
between the partners. The word "dissolve" is used in the sense
just explained, and is supported by the weight of authority.'
aCal. Civ. Code, § 2417; Ga. Civ. Code, § 2633; Mont: Civ. Code,
§ 3262; N. Dak. Civ. Code, § 5848; Okla. Civ. Code, § 485o; S. Dak.
Civ. Code, § 1736; Moore v. Price, 116 Ala. 247 (1896); Lapenta v.
Lettieri, 72 Conn. 377 (1899); Clements v. Norris, 8 Ch. D. i29, 133
(Eng. 1878); Monroe v. Conner, 15 Me. 178 (1838) ; Cape Sable Case,
3 Bland. 6o6, 674 (Md. 184o); Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256
(1884); Carr v. Hertz, 54 N. J. Eq. I27 (1895); Skinner v. Dayton, 19
Johns. 5,3, 537 (N. Y. 1822); Mason v. Connell, i Whart. 381, 388 (Pa.
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The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such
a personal one that equity cannot enforce it even where the
agreement provides that the partnership shall continue 'for a
definite time. The power of any partner to terminate the rela-
tion, even though in doing so he breaks a contract, should, it is
submitted, be recognized. The rights of the parties upon a dis-
solution in contravention of the agreement are safeguarded by
Section 38 (2). Under that Section, where a dissolution is caused
in contravention of the partnership agreement, each partner as
against a partner who has caused the dissolution wrongfully
has a right to damages for breach of agreement. The partners
who have not caused the dissolution wrongfully have also the
right to continue the business in the same name, either by them-
selves or jointly with others, during the agreed term for the
partnership and "for that purpose may possess thte partnership
property, provided they secure the payment by bond approved
by the court, or pay to any partner who has caused the dissolution
wrongfully, the value of his interest in the partnership at the
dissolution, less any damages" (caused by the dissolution) . . .
"and in like manner indemnify him against all present or future
partnership liabilities."
Section 35 provides that which a partner must do on disso-
lution to be certain that his co-partners may not, by carrying on
the business in the partnership name, against his consent, make
him liable for future contracts. The Act provides that a partner
cannot, after dissolution, bind the partnership to third persons
by any act which is not necessary to wind up the partnership
affairs or complete transactions then unfinished, unless such third
person, not having had relations with the partnership by which
a credit was extended to the partnership, has no knowledge or
notice of the dissolution, and the fact of dissolution has not been
published in a newspaper of general circulation of the place (or
of each place if more than one) at which the partnership business
was regularly carried on, or unless such third person having had
relations with the partnership by which a credit was extended,
1836) ; Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 168, 176 (1868) ; Karrick v. Hannaman,
168 U. S. 328, 334 (897).
The English law is opposed to" this view: Peacock v. Peacock, 16 Ves.
49 (i8og); Featherstonhaugh v. Fenwick, 17 Ves. 298 (18io); Crawshay
v. Maide, i Swanst. 509 (1818) ; Ferrero v. Buhlineyer, 34 How. Pr. 33
(N. Y. 1867); Lindley 6oi; Storey, § 275.
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upon the faith of the partnership, has no knowledge or notice
of the dissolution. Under existing law it is doubtful in practi-
cally all jurisdictions whether the third persons who should
receive notice are all those who have had business relations with
the partnership, or only those who have had relations with the
partnership by which a credit was extended upon the faith of
the partnership. The practical impossibility of the partners
knowing, by any feasible system of bookkeeping, all the persons
with whom they have had dealings, unless credit has been
extended, supports the wording by the Commissioners.
9
Another uncertainty which would be ended by the Act is
whether a partner, after all the debts of the partnership have
been paid, is entitled to have the rest of the property sold in
order to obtain his share in cash, or whether he has merely the
right to a physical partition of the remaining partnership prop-
erty. Section 38 provides that, unless otherwise agreed, each
partner has a right to have his share of the surplus paid to him
in cash.
Section 4o distinctly states that among the assets of a partner-
ship are "The contributions of the partners necessary for the
payment of all the liabilities." The adoption of this clause will
end the present confusion as to whether the contributions of the
partners towards the losses of the partnership are partnership
assets or not, a confusion which in the Bankruptcy Act has ren-
dered it possible in some districts to put a partnership containing
a solvent partner into bankruptcy. 0
There remain, as previously pointed out, two important ques-
tions in our present law of partnership on which there exists an
almost hopeless confusion both in theory and practice, making
the actual administration of the law difficult, and often, inequit-
able. One of these questions concerns the rights of the partner
and the separate creditors of a partner in partnership property;
' In further support of the provision as written, see 2 Bates, §§ 613,
614; Burdick, 57; Mechem, § 262; Beale's Parsons, § 319; Cal. Civ.
Code, § 2453; 3o Cyc. 671. There is also authority for merely requiring
that such "third person" shall have had dealings with the partnership.
Bates, 612, 613; Collyer, 163; 3 Kent Comm. 67; Lindley, 249; Mechem,
261, 262; James Parsons, §§ 179, i8o, 181; Pollock, 98; Shumaker, § 121.
"0See In re Bertenshaw, 157 Fed. 363 (19o7) ; Contra In re Forbes, 128
Fed. 137 (1904). See also Vaccaro v. Bank, 1O3 Fed. 436 (igoo); In re
Mercur, 122 Fed. 384 (19o3); Barry v. Foyles, i Pet. U. S. 3i (1828);
West v. Lea, 174 U. S. 590 (1899).
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the other, the rights of different classes of creditors where a
business has been continued without liquidation by successive
partnerships containing one or more common members. To
understand the Act it is necessary to see clearly the way in
which it deals with these two important subjects. To do this
it is necessary to understand the confusions and difficulties of
existing law. First we will have to see what are the rights of
a partner and the separate creditors of a partner in partnership
property.
As long ago as 1693 the rights of a judgment creditor of one
partner came before Lord Holt in the case of Heydon v. Hey-
don.11  Coleman and Heydon were partners. A judgment was
had against Coleman, and all the partnership goods were taken
in execution. Lord Holt held that the sheriff must seize all the
goods and sell the undivided moiety thereof. He also declared
that the property should be delivered to the purchaser, and that
then the purchaser and the partner, Heydon, would hold the
property as tenants in common.
Three propositions lie at the foundation of this decision: First:
Partners are co-owners of partnership property; Second: They
are joint tenants; Third: The purchaser of the partner's interest
is a co-owner with the other partners of the partnership property;
but the form of co-ownership, instead of being joint tenancy, is
that known as tenancy in common. That Lord Holt should have
come to the first conclusion was inevitable, as it is in exact
accordance with the fact and with the understanding of partners.
That he should have come to the second conclusion, namely, that
the partners hold partnership property as joint tenants, while most
unfortunate, was almost inevitable.
Ownership does not necessarily always involve the same legal
incidents. Owners have different rights. The life tenant or
holder and the tenant or holder in fee both own property, but
their respective ownerships have attached to them different legal
incidents. In the same way there are different legal incidents to
different kinds of co-ownership. At the time of this decision,
three kinds of co-ownership were definitely recognized-copar-
cenary, tenancy in common, and joint tenancy. When, therefore,
the courts recognized partners as co-owners of partnership prop-
erty, the next question was : In which one of these three ways
do they hold? Joint tenancy had the legal incident known as
I Salkeld 392.
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survivorship; that is to say, on the death of one of the co-owners,
his share, instead of passing to his heir, passed to the surviving
owner or owners. This incident, which was peculiar to joint
tenancy, fitted into a very practical necessity of partnership. If,
on the death of a partner, his right in partnership property passed
to his heirs, they would have a right to interfere in the winding
up of the business. In the seventeenth century, as today, it was
the understanding of partners that the survivor, in case of the
death of one of them, should have the right to wind up the part-
nership affairs. The rule is fundamental that neither for the
purpose of carrying on nor for the purpose of winding up the
partnership does the heir of my partner become, on my partner's
death, my partner.
Having, probably for the reason indicated, determined that
partners held partnership property as joint tenants, all the other
legal incidents of a joint tenancy were given to the co-ownership.
Whatever may have been the origin of joint tenancy, it is certain
that it did not grow up as a result of the partnership relation.
It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that the application of the
legal incidents of joint tenancy to partnership property at once
produced, as it is still producing, inconvenience and inequities.
The celebrated case of Heydon v. Heydon is one of the most
prominent examples. Every step which Lord Holt indicated as
proper in the case was consistent with the legal incidents of joint
tenancy, and every step violates some fundamentally important
principle of the partnership relation. For instance, the sheriff is
allowed to seize partnership property. He does this at the
instance of a judgment creditor of one of the partners. It is
fundamental that a partner cannot use partnership property for
his own benefit. He should use it for partnership purposes only.
And yet, though the partner could not have used the partnership
property to pay his separate debts, his separate creditor, securing
a judgment against him, is permitted to seize partnership property
for that purpose. Again, it is fundamental to the successful
conduct of a partnership that the partnership property shall not
be taken by strangers. Yet in Heydon v. Heydon the court
allowed the purchaser of what is called the partner's moiety to
take into his possession partnership property, and this in spite
of the fact that the purchaser could not put it to any beneficial
use. The purchaser did not become a partner. He could, how-
ever, insist upon a division of the property, and could insist on
this division in the face of partnership articles which declared that
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the partnership should not be dissolved or the property divided
until the expiration of a specified term, which had not expired.
Here, again, the decision of Lord Holt gave to the purchaser of
the partner's moiety a greater right than the partner himself
possessed.
In Iowa, to avoid the consequences of this decision, a debtor
partner or his solvent associates are allowed to maintain a suit
in a court of equity, to which all the partners and the creditor
are parties, for a partnership accounting, the appointment of
a receiver and an injunction restraining the sheriff from selling
the debtor's uncertain interest in the property.'12 In other juris-
dictions, as in Pennsylvania before the adoption of the Act, acts
had been passed which permitted the purchaser to bring a bill
in equity against the partnership for the purpose of ascertaining
the partner's interest in the property purchased.
The fundamental defect of all these attempts to avoid the con-
sequences of regarding partners as joint tenants of partnership
property is the assumption that it is possible to ascertain the value
of a partner's right in a specific piece of partnership property.
Now it is fundamental to our partnership law that a partner has
no beneficial interest' in any specific piece of partnership property.
The contract of partnership involves a mutual pledge by all the
partners that the common fund shall be devoted first to the pay-
ment of partnership debts. After the debts are paid, if any-
property remains, it is to be devoted to the payment of the credits
standing to the accounts of each partner on the books of the firm.
In view of these rules, it is impossible to ascertain, except by
purely arbitrary and artificial rules, a partner's beneficial interest
in a specific chattel belonging to the partnership. A single illus-
tration will make this clear: A and B are partners. The value
of the partnership property is $Ioo,ooo; the liabilities amount to
$5o,ooo. A has contributed $i5,ooo and has a three-fourth's
interest in the profits. A separate judgment creditor of A levies
on A's interest in specific chattels belonging to the partnership,
the value of these chattels being, let us suppose, $5ooo. The-
chattels themselves must, under the partnership agreement, be
still used for partnership purposes, and on dissolution, if still part
of the partnership property, they must be sold. If the sheriff*
has levied on anything, it was not on a right in these chattels, but
'See Aultinan vz. Fuller, 53 Iowa, 6o (i88o) ; Iowa Civil Code, §§ 3977-
and 3978.
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on a fractional part of A's interest in the partnership. But how
is it to be determined what fractional part of A's interest in the
partnership has been levied upon? Does the judgment creditor
secure a lien to the value of $5000 upon A's interest, or has he
a lien for three-fourths of $5000 on A's interest, or has he a lien
on A's interest in the partnership which in amount bears the
same proportion to the total value of the chattels, $5ooo, as the
amount which A would receive should the partnership be liqui-
dated, bears to the total value of the partnership property at the
time of the levy? It is impossible to answer these questions.
Indeed, it is almost impossible to analyze them. A partner's
interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus.
This can be ascertained on an account between the partners. But
his fractional interest in a specific piece of partnership property
it is not possible to ascertain.
Faced with the practical impossibility of ascertaining what
the interest of a partner is in the specific property levied on, the
courts have treated bills in equity brought by purchasers to ascer-
tain that interest, as bills to ascertain his interest in the partner-
ship, something that has not been levied on at all. Where this
procedure is carried out we have the sheriff levying on a partner's
interest in specific partnership property; the sale of that interest,
and then a bill by the purchaser to obtain the partner's interest
in the partnership. The practical defect of this procedure is that
it requires the sheriff to sell the interest of the partner before the
value of that interest is ascertained. A sheriff's sale, where the
value of the thing sold is uncertain, usually means that the only
purchaser is the creditor, or perhaps, a solvent partner. Out-
siders do not wish to buy at sheriff sale something which may
be worth nothing.
The proposed Act deals with the subject in a radically different
way. Part V of the Act relates to the property rights of a part-
ner. Section 24 declares that a partner's property rights are:
(i) His rights in specific partnership property; (2) His interest
in the partnership; (3) His right to participate in the manage-
ment. Section 25 deals with the nature of a partner's rights in
specific partnership property. It asserts that a partner is a
co-owner with his partners of specific partnership property, hold-
ing, not as joint tenants, but "as tenants in partnership." The
rest of the Section is devoted to definite statements of the different
legal incidents of this tenancy.
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These incidents are in the Act made to accord with the prac-
tical necessities of the partnership relation. Thus it is declared
that while any partner has an equal right with his partners to
possess partnership property for partnership purposes, he has not
a right to possess such property for any other purpose, without
the consent of his partners. It is also declared that a partner's
right in specific partnership property is not assignable, except in
connection with the assignment of the rights of all the partners
in the same property. In other words, a partner may assign
partnership property for a partnership purpose, but if he attempts
to assign the property for his own purposes he makes no assign-
ment at all, because the Act destroys the quality of assignability
for any but a partnership purpose. If a partner cannot assign
partnership property for his own purpose, it follows that his
separate judgment creditor has no right to levy on such property.
Section 26 deals with the second property right of a partner-
his interest in the partnership. This interest is defined as his
share of the profits and surplus. He may assign his interest to
others, and it is also made subject to the payment of any judg-
ments secured by a separate creditor. Thus Section 28 provides
that the court which entered the judgment, or any other court, on
application of a judgment creditor, may charge the interest of a
partner with the payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judg-
ment; the court appointing a receiver for his share of the profits,
and making all other orders, directions and inquiries which the
debtor partner might have made or which the circumstances of
the case may require.
After the adoption of the Act, when a judgment is secured
against a partner by his separate creditor, all that the creditor will
have to do is to apply to the court which gave him the judgment,
or any other court, to issue an order on the other partners to
pay him the profits which would be otherwise paid to his debtor,
or to make any further order which will result in his securing
the payment of his judgment without unduly interfering with the
rights of the remaining partners in partnership property.
The other branch of the law of partnership in which at present
serious confusion and inequities occur is that which relates to the
rights of creditors when a business is carried on without liqui-
dation by several successive partnerships having one or more
members in common. These difficulties and inequities will
perhaps be best shown by a specific illustration.
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
A, B and C are partners. E et al., are their creditors. With-
out any notice to E et al., or any settlement with them, D is
admitted as a partner in the business. At the common law, as
under the proposed Act, the admission of D dissolves the first
partnership and creates a second partnership, composed of A, B,
C and D. The property which belonged to the first partnership
is now assumed by the law to belong to the second partnership.
The second partnership contracts debts to other creditors, though
in many instances these creditors may not know of the existence
of D or that a new partnership has been formed. If now A, B,
C and D, individually and as partners, become bankrupt, under
the existing law, E et al., the creditors of the first partnership,
are not creditors of the second partnership. The partnership
property, however, is the property of the second partnership, the
practical result being that F et al., the creditors of the second
partnership, have a right to all property in the business until
they are paid in full, before E et aL., who became creditors prior
to D's admission to the business, get anything.
A similar clap-trap and inequitable result often takes place
when a partner retires and the business is continued by the
remaining partners, or by the remaining partners and other
persons, without the liquidation of the affairs of the partnership
of which the retiring partner was a member. Thus, if A, B
and C are partners and A assigns to B and C his interest in the
partnership, B and C continuing the business without any agree-
ment to pay the partnership debts, under the present law, the
property of the first partnership becomes the property of the
second partnership, that composed of B and C, but the creditors
of the first partnership are not regarded as creditors of the
second partnership, though they are the creditors of the members
of that partnership. The creditors of the first partnership are,
therefore, often unable to secure satisfaction of their claims,
because the property in the business must first be devoted to the
payment of those creditors who extended their credit after the
retirement of A, and this result is reached, though at the time
of A's assignment to B and C the partnership may have been
solvent, and the business may have been continued by the second
partnership without any notification to the creditors of the first
partnership of A's retirement from the business. This inequit-
able result the courts have attempted, in not a few instances, to
prevent by declaring that the assignment of the property of the
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first partnership to the second partnership was a fraud on the
creditors of the first partnership, though no fraud was intended.
It will be noted that by transferring all the property in the
business to the first partnership, those who extended credit to the
second partnership cannot obtain any part of this property until
the creditors of the first partnership are paid in full. It there-
fore results that the creditors of the second partnership are placed
by the court in as hard a position as that from which the creditors
of the first partnership have been relieved by the court's action.
The courts have also applied liberally the rule expressed in
Collyer on Partnerships, that incoming partners may assume the
debts of the concern with which they connect themselves; and
this assumption may, both at law and in equity, be proved either
by their express covenant or contract, or be inferred from the
terms of it, or from the treatment of such debts by the firm, to
the knowledge of the incoming partners, as the debts of the new
firm.
The proposed Act does away with the uncertainties and inequi-
ties just described by two changes in existing law. One change
is that embodied in Section 41. This Section provides that when
a business is conducted by a partnership and a partial change in
the personnel of the owners of the business takes place without
liquidation of the affairs of the dissolved partnership, by the
admission of a partner or the retirement or death of a partner
and the assignment of his interest to those continuing the busi-
ness, the creditors of the dissolved partnership become the credi-
tors of the partnership continuing the business. In short, this
Section recognizes the fact that the business has been one business
from the start, and that those who have extended credit to the
different partnerships conducting it should all, on the failure of
the business, have equal rights in the property devoted to the
business.
The other change in the law necessary to carry out the principle
just explained is that embodied in Section i. This Section
makes a person who is admitted into a going business as a part-
ner liable for all the debts of the partnership into which he is
admitted contracted before his admission, except that his liability
for these prior debts is confined to his interest in the partnership
V property. Thus, suppose A and B are partners. The partner-
ship is indebted to E et al. C is admitted into the business and
a new partnership of A, B and C is formed. The debts to E
et al., are not liquidated. C contributes $5ooo to the business.
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Under the Act, C would be liable to E et aL, but his liability would
be limited to his interest in the firm. He would only be liable in
respect to his separate estate to those creditors who extended
credit after his admission.
Though this Section changes the formal statement of the law,
which is to the effect that an incoming partner is not liable for
debts contracted before his admission, as a matter of fact, the
Section, as worded, does not go as far towards making the incom-
ing partner liable as most of the actual decisions of our courts.
For where the courts hold, in the cases referred to, that the
new partnership formed as a result of the admission of the part-
ner has assumed the debts of the old partnership, they make
the new partner liable for these debts, not only to the extent of
his contribution to the business, but unlimitedly.
Two other, though minor changes in the law, remain to be
mentioned. Section 26 provides that a partner's interest in the
partnership-that is, his share in the profits and surplus-is per-
sonal property. This provision reverses the rule as established
by the Massachusetts case of Shearer v. Shearer,
1 3 which has
been followed in most American jurisdictions. Experience has
shown that the English courts in regarding the interest of the
partner in the partnership as personal property, irrespective of
the physical character of the property of the partnership, pro-
ceeded along sound, and therefore, practical lines.
14 Partnership
property is subject to the payment of partnership debts. Part-
ners in winding up partnership affairs have a right to realize
on partnership real estate before they sell the personal property
of the partnership, if they consider such prior sale of the real
estate an advantage to the firm. The fundamental trouble with
the doctrine of Shearer v. Shearer is, that if. the partnership
agreement provides for the continuation of the business after the
death of one of the partners, it is not possible to ascertain whether
the real estate will or will not be sold for the payment of debts
or to supply money for the carrying on of the business. There-
fore, it may be impossible to determine whether the heir of the
deceased partner inherits a fraction of the partner's interest in
the partnership until several years after the death of his ancestor,
and the ultimate determination depends, not on any principle of
law or justice, but on the whim of the surviving partners. The
'98 Mass. 1o7 (1867).
"4Darby v. Darby, 3 Drewry 495 (1856).
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provision of the Act which treats the interest of the deceased
partner as personal property, makes for practical convenience
as well as being in accord with the Section, heretofore referred
to, which provides that every partner, on winding up, has a right
to receive in cash the value of his interest in the firm.
The only other change in general law is in the Section relating
to the right of a partner to contribution from co-partners for
losses on contracts, entered into after dissolution. This Section
provides that when dissolution is by death or bankruptcy of a
partner, a partner thereafter acting for the partnership who had
no knowledge or notice of the death or bankruptcy, may ask his
co-partners to contribute their share of the liability created.
Under existing law, where one partner dies, a partner who there-
after makes a contract for the carrying on of the business, though
he makes the contract without knowledge and also without notice
of the death, must assume the entire liability. He cannot ask
his other partners to contribute towards his loss, if any, on the
contract, even though they were ignorant of the death of the
partner, and also even though such deceased partner was entirely
inactive and may have resided at any distance from the actual
place of business. The Commissioners believed that this was
unjust to the acting partner or partners. The rule of the com-
mon law has been modified as to agency,1 and it is submitted
that the Commissioners are right in believing that our partner-
ship law, which here is but a branch of the law agency, should
follow the present agency rule. What has been said of the death
of a partner applies also to the bankruptcy of a partner. If
there are a number of partners, and one of them becomes bank-
rupt, and another partner having no knowledge or notice of this
fact, makes a contract in the ordinary course of business, there
appears no reason why he should not be able to call on his other
partners, not bankrupt or deceased, to contribute towards any
loss which his separate estate may sustain on account of the
contract.
At the outset it was noted that the Partnership Act had been
in course of preparation by the Commissioners and their Com-
' Cassidy v. M'Kenzie, 4 W. & S. 282 (Pa. 1842); Cal. Civ. Code,
§ 2356; N. Dak. Civ. Code, §§ 115o, 1151; Saunder's Rev. Civ. Code of
La. (I909), § 3032; Md. Rev. Code (878), 388, Art. 44, § 31; S. C.
Gen. Stat. (1882), § i3o2; English Conveyancing Act (188I), § 47;
English Bankruptcy Act (1883), § 38; Kent. Comm. 646; Lindley, 24o,
et seq.; Mechem on Agency, § 245; Blackwood Wright (2d Ed. Eng.)
on Principal and Agent, 332, et seq.; Story on Agency (1882), 598.
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mittee on Commercial Law for more than twelve years. This
was partly due to the fact that when the Committee on Com-
mercial Law first undertook to draft a Partnership Act they and
the draftsman selected, Dean Ames, were confronted with a diffi-
culty from which most legal subjects are happily free. There
exists-we may almost say existed-two theories of the legal
nature of a partnership. One of these regards a partnership as
an association of two or more persons carrying on business as
co-principals. The name "aggregate," which is sometimes given
to this theory, does not very happily express the underlying idea
that in partnership transactions the individual partners deal
directly with each other and with third persons. This theory is
also called the common law theory of partnership, because in the
great majority of decisions relative to partnership transactions,
consciously or unconsciously, the courts proceed on the under-
lying assumption referred to.
The other theory is, that when two or more persons form a
partnership, the law should regard the association as having a
legal personality distinct from the individual legal personalities
of each partner. Under this theory, all partnership rights are
vested in this legal personality of the partnership; on it are
imposed all partnership obligations. The partners are the agents
of the legal entity. The theory is called the entity theory-again
not a very happy designation, as the essence of the theory is not
that it regards the partnership or association as a distinct thing,
but rather that it endows the association with a separate legal
personality. By its advocates it has also been called the "mer-
cantile theory," on the assumption that business men in partner-
ship transactions, whether inter se or with third persons, proceed
on the fundamental premise on which the theory is based. Such
an assumption, however, is entirely unwarranted. Business men,
as such, have to do with fact, not legal theory. When a business
man deals with persons carrying on business in partnership, the
character of the partners and their total wealth, individual and
collective, is all that is important to him. The rule that partners
are unlimitedly liable for partnership debts is the only thing
approaching a legal theory which he need carry in his mind.
In 19o2, when the Committee on Commercial Law began to
prepare the first draft of the Act, the second or entity theory,
though its advocates admitted it changed our entire law of part-
nership, had gained a large number of adherents, among others,
Dean Ames.
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Mr. Ames believed that it would be impossible to solve many
of the existing confusions and inequities in the law of partner-
ship, especially the rights of the separate creditors of a partner,
without adopting the entity theory. The two drafts which he
prepared were both drawn on that theory.
That the entity theory does enable a satisfactory solution of
the rights of separate creditors of the partnership to be had
is evident. If the partnership is a legal entity against which
the partners have claims for their shares in the profits and in the
surplus, after the payments of debts to third persons, then the
separate creditor of a partner may garnishee the fictitious legal
person or bring a bill in equity against it for the purpose of
ascertaining the claims of his debtor, and having these claims paid
over to him, in the satisfaction of his judgment.
When the writer was selected to continue the work of Mr.
Ames, it was not long before the difficulties created by the entity
theory in other branches of the law of partnership began to
appear, and I began to doubt the possibility of drafting a satis-
factory act on this theory. It appeared to me that the proper
way to settle the controversy was to present to the Committee
on Commercial Law two drafts, one drawn on the entity and the
other on the common law theory of partnership, and ask the
Committee, before submitting the drafts to the Commissioners,
to call a meeting of persons having special knowledge of the law
of partnership to discuss the drafts and the respective theories
underlying them. This idea was carried out. Two drafts were
drawn, and the conference suggested held in Philadelphia in the
fall of 191o. Practically all teachers and writers on the law of
partnership in the United States were present, as also a number
of lawyers known to have made a special study of the subject.
At the conclusion of the discussion, the members of the con-
ference all joined in recommending that the Act be drawn on
the common law or aggregate theory, and that the partners be
treated as owners of partnership property holding by a special
tenancy, which should be called tenancy in partnership. This
recommendation, as explained, has been carried out.
One of the chief difficulties with the entity theory is that, while
it enables us to solve the rights of the separate judgment creditor
of a partner in the partnership property, it makes it impossible
to work out in a satisfactory way the rights of a firm creditor
against the separate property of a partner. If the partnership
is a separate legal personality, what is the relation of the partners
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to those who have business transactions with the partnership?
Are they to be regarded as co-principals and the partnership
contract with third persons as a joint contract of the partners
and the legal entity; or shall the partners be regarded as guar-
antors or as sureties; or shall the partners be regarded as not
having any legal relation to those who deal with the partnership,
but merely contracting with the legal entity to pay partnership
debts, if the property of the entity is not sufficient to pay them?
This last position, which denies all contractual relations between
the partners and the person dealing with the partnership, was the
one taken by Mr. Ames. Indeed, consideration seemed to indi-
cate that it was the only position that gave any promise of a
satisfactory solution of the many problems raised. If the part-
ners have no contract with those who deal with the partnership,
it follows that a firm creditor who secures a judgment cannot
levy that judgment on the separate property of a partner. He
must, to be consistent with the theory, be required after judg-
ment to bring a new proceeding against the partner whose sepa-
rate property he desires to subject to the payment of his debt.
This is a cumbersome proceeding. It is based on a theory which
violates the idea of every business man who deals with a partner-
ship, that he is dealing with a group of persons who are directly
and unlimitedly liable for partnership obligations.
Should we abandon Mr. Ames' position, and while adopting
the entity theory, regard the partners as co-principals or guaran-
tors of the entity, while some of our difficulties disappear, the
pertinent inquiry may be made: Why create a fictitious legal
person when in every suit you have to join the partners as
co-principals? Are you not merely adding to an already com-
plicated situation, a fictitious person, which has to be constantly
considered in all proceedings by or against the partnership?
The most serious practical difficulty, however, in the way of
the entity theory is, that, as Mr. Ames admitted, it necessitates
the creation of a system for the registration of all partnerships,
and a provision that no partnership can exist until it is registered.
Any system which prevents a partnership from being in existence
until it is registered, and which thus introduces into the law of
partnership the difficulties which surround de facto corporations,
should not be tolerated for a moment unless the necessity for the
adoption of the theory is imperative. No such necessity exists.
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